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1. introduction
Article 28A(1)(13) of the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights (‘The Protocol’) lists ‘Illicit exploitation of natural
resources’ as a criminal offence within the Court’s jurisdiction (hereafter ‘Illicit
Exploitation’). The Protocol goes on to deﬁne Illicit Exploitation as including
seven different sub-offences – sometimes vague, often groundbreaking – that
might attract criminal responsibility under the aegis of this new crime.1 The
sole limiting criterion is whether acts of illicit exploitation of natural
resources are ‘of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region or
the Union’. In conjunction with the new mandate of the African Court,
which includes the exercise of jurisdiction over corporations for the ﬁrst time
I wish to thank my colleagues Dr. Mamadou Hébié and Dr. Sergey Vasiliev for their valuable
comments during the drafting of this chapter. Any remaining mistakes of course are my own.
1 Art. 28L Bis of the Protocol, entitled “Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources”, reads:
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘Illicit exploitation of natural resources’ means any of the
following acts if they are of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region or the
Union:
(a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of
peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources;
(b) Concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in
violation of the legal and regulatory procedures of the State concerned;
(c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices;
(d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly one-sided;
(e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned;
(f ) Exploiting natural resources without complying with norms relating to the protection
of the environment and the security of the people and the staff; and
(g) Violating the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource
certiﬁcation mechanism.
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in an international treaty, the prohibition of ‘illicit exploitation of natural
resources’ creates an offence with especially sharp teeth, for businesspeople,
their corporations, military actors and politicians. The crime constitutes an
important innovation in international law, since it offers a distinct legal basis
for prosecution of a wider array of acts covered by the war crime of pillage.2
Nonetheless, it also comes with a set of major limitations, not the least of
which is its great vagueness.
This chapter offers a critical doctrinal overview of the seven sub-offences
that fall within the wider banner of this new crime of Illicit Exploitation,
simultaneously pointing to a range of interpretative possibilities that might
accord with recent thinking about the relationship between law and resource
predation. We include a set of recurring shortcomings with the provision as
drafted in The Protocol even though we agree that accountability for resource
predation in Africa is long overdue. Our overall impression is that the provi-
sion is overly broad and insufﬁciently precise in many manifestations of its
form, but we hope that what follows functions as an introduction of sorts,
which other scholars will use as a point of departure for far more detailed
scholarly treatment. Accordingly, we divide this chapter into three parts. In
section one, we situate the novel crime within pre-existing avenues for regu-
lating illegal exploitation of natural resources in international law. In section
two, we go on to examine the scope of the provision, focusing on its chapeau
and the seven different sub-offences it covers. The chapter concludes in
section three with a brief overview of the crime’s strengths and weaknesses.
2. situating the novel crime
Symbolically, the criminalization of illicit exploitation of natural resources is
both signiﬁcant and timely. With the formulation of a novel international
crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources, the African community has
taken an important step in addressing one of its major concerns in recent
decades. The illicit exploitation of natural resources is associated with the
ﬁnancing of armed conﬂicts, which unsurprisingly, has very negative effects
on local populations’ enjoyment of basic human rights, physical security and
economic wellbeing. Over the past decades, natural resources have become
2 Pillage was also the legal basis for the International Court of Justice to hold the Ugandan
State responsible for the looting by Ugandan soldiers of the natural resources of the DR Congo.
See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005,
para. 245.
Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources 591
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.022
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 06 May 2019 at 07:37:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
one of the principal sources of revenue for armed groups, replacing Cold War
superpower sponsorship.3 In armed conﬂicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Côte
d’Ivoire, the DR Congo and the Central African Republic, natural resources
did not necessarily provide the sole means or motivations for armed violence,
but they were at least one of several important causal factors that helped
sustain bloodshed. Thus, this new offence of illicit exploitation of natural
resources represents an important symbolic response to much publicized
issues in a variety of African war zones.
The problems that ﬂow from the illegal exploitation of natural resources are
by no means limited to the funding of armed conﬂicts, however. An investi-
gation led by various international organizations in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC), for instance, concluded that around 98 per cent of net
proﬁts from illegal natural resource exploitation in the DRC – particularly
gold, charcoal and timber – goes to transnational organized criminal net-
works, while armed groups retain only 2 per cent of these proﬁts.4 This
blurring is typical of present day warfare, which is characterized by an
important interaction between the local and the global, and which resembles
private enterprise more than traditional ideologically motivated battles
between military groups.5 Aside from organized crime, illicit exploitation is
also a key component in kleptocratic governance, a frequent part of endemic
corruption and illegal tax evasion,6 and a central driver of the famed resource
curse, whereby the richest countries in terms of natural resource endowment
are, very counterintuitively, the poorest in terms of standards of living.7 Thus,
3 See K. Ballentine & J. Sherman (ed.), The Political Economy of Armed Conﬂict: Beyond Greed
and Grievance, International Peace Academy (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
2003), at 1–3.
4 UNEP-MONUSCO-OSESG, ‘Experts’ background report on illegal exploitation and trade in
natural resources beneﬁtting organized criminal groups and recommendations on
MONUSCO’s role in fostering stability and peace in eastern DR Congo’, Final report, 15 April
2015, available at www.unep.org (last visited 1 February 2016).
5 See on this e.g. M. Kaldor,New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press, Second Edition 2006); and W. Reno, ‘CSR and Corporate
Engagement with Parties to Armed Conﬂict’, in C. Walker-Said and J.D. Kelly, Corporate
Social Responsibility?: Human Rights in the New Global Economy (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press Books 2015), at 259–77.
6 According to the Africa Progress Panel, Africa lost US$63.4 billion from illicit ﬁnancial
outﬂows between 2008 and 2010, of which US$38.4 billion was related to mispricing by
multinational companies operating in Africa. Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives:
Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All, Africa Progress Report 2013, Figure 22, at 66.
7 See R. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis
(Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 1993); M.L. Ross, ‘The Political Economy of the
Resource Curse’, 51(2) World Politics (1999) 297–322; and J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, ‘The
Curse of Natural Resources’, European Economic Review 45 (2001), at 827–38.
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the illegal exploitation of natural resources is clearly a problem with long
historical antecedents and multiple negative impacts in contemporary Africa,
thus explaining the desire to criminalize the practice.
A range of complementary initiatives have demonstrated the same desire in
recent years, such that this new crime overlaps with a number of related areas
of law. If these complementary initiatives underscore the priority the inter-
national community attaches to the problem, especially in Africa, they create
an interesting and complex overlap with this new offence of ‘illicit exploitation
of natural resources.’ In what follows, we ﬂesh out several of these points of
overlap in order to isolate the added normative reach the new offence of Illicit
Exploitation offers and to point out opportunities for synergy with pre-existing
regulatory initiatives. As we will see, the points of overlap include a range of
other criminal offences that might attach to different aspects of resource
predation as well as a set of non-criminal schemes that attempt to regulate
the same sorts of behaviours.
With respect to overlapping criminal offences, Illicit Exploitation partially
overlaps with the war crime of pillage.8 In the aftermath of the Second World
War, a number of businesspeople were prosecuted for pillaging natural
resources during the war, principally because their exploitation was ‘illegal’
insofar as the true owners of manganese, coal, iron and oil never consented to
their appropriation. This exploitation was achieved through a range of different
strategies and techniques, but courts invariably concluded that these practices
constituted pillage in war.9 Pillage appears to be gaining traction as a legal
response to the illegal exploitation of natural resources in modern resource
wars too. Swiss authorities conducted a formal investigation into one of the
largest gold reﬁneries in the world for complicity in pillage a few years ago,10
8 For a more extensive analysis of this crime and its relevance for illegal natural resources
exploitation, see J.G. Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural
Resources (New York: Open Society Justice Initiative Publication 2011); and L.J. van den Herik
and D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and
Pitfalls of Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation during
Armed Conﬂict’, Vol. 22(3) Criminal Law Forum (2011) 237–73.
9 See e.g. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council
Law No. 10, Vol. IX, the Krupp case (Washington: Government Printing Ofﬁce 1950), at
1344–5; Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10, Vol. XIV, France v. Roechling (Washington: Government Printing Ofﬁce
1949), at 1113 and 1124.
10 The investigation was closed in 2015, because the Swiss prosecutor was unable to proof that the
company was aware of the criminal origin of the gold it reﬁned, showing the difﬁculties in
prosecuting companies further up the supply chain. See J.G. Stewart, ‘The Argos Heraeus
Decision on Corporate Pillage of Gold’, 19 October 2015, available through http://
jamesgstewart.com/the-argor-heraeus-decision-on-corporate-pillage-of-gold/ (visited
27 September 2016) for a legal analysis of this decision and links to the prosecutor’s decision.
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and a Belgian businessman was arrested by the Belgian authorities in 2015
for allegedly collaborating with former Liberian President Charles Taylor
and a rebel group in pillaging diamonds from Sierra Leone.11 Moreover, in
September 2016, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for-
mally published a new prosecutorial strategy, which included a commitment
to ‘give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that
are committed by means of, or that result in. . . the illegal exploitation of
natural resources.’12
States have also developed comparable criminal offences through regional
agreements to tackle the illicit exploitation of natural resources, notably within
the framework of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
(ICGLR).13 Most importantly, a specialized Protocol Against the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources was adopted in 2006 as part of the Pact
on Security, Stability and Development, which forms the basis for cooperation
between the ICGLR Member States. This Protocol aims to promote the
development of effective mechanisms to address illegal exploitation of natural
resources, to enhance cooperation amongst the ICGLRMember States in this
ﬁeld and to promote harmonization of their national legislations, policies and
procedures.14 One of the most important tools developed by the ICGLR for
this purpose is a regional certiﬁcation mechanism.15 From the perspective of
criminal law, however, the most notable aspect of this parallel treaty regime is
contained in in Art 12 of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources, which also contemplates a novel set of domestic offences
governing what it calls ‘the illegal exploitation of natural resources’.16
11 See https://trialinternational.org/latest-post/michel-desaedeleer/ (visited 8 December 2016). The
suspect died in custody on 28 September 2016.
12 Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization, para. 41. www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=policy-paper-on-case-selection-and-prioritisation (visited 4
October 2016).
13 The ICGLR is an inter-governmental organization established by the States located in the
African Great Lakes region to enhance regional cooperation in the ﬁelds of Peace and Security;
Democracy and Good Governance; Economic Development and Regional Integration; and
Humanitarian and Social Issues. See www.icglr.org for more information.
14 ICGLR Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006,
Art. 2.
15 See Art. 11 of the Protocol, which was adopted in September 2014. See also www.icglr.org for
the certiﬁcation manual (visited 29 March 2016).
16 Art 12 of the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources reads as follows:
‘Each Member State shall ensure that all acts of illegal exploitation of natural resources
are offenses under its criminal law. Such acts shall include:
(a) Concluding an agreement to exploit resources, in violation of the principle of
peoples’ sovereignty over their natural resources;
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Of course, forms of ‘illegality’ that might inform our understanding of
‘illicit’ exploitation of natural resources for the purposes of this new crime
need not be limited to criminal law. It is perfectly plausible that the new crime
of Illicit Exploitation represents the criminalization of a range of regulatory
schemes that were never meant to be punished through criminal law before-
hand, and on its face, The Protocol purports to do just this. At the global level,
for instance, sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council seek to
break the link between illegal trade in natural resources on one hand and
conﬂict ﬁnancing on the other. The Security Council has imposed sanctions
in a number of instances, including diamond sanctions against Angola, Sierra
Leone and Liberia as well as travel and ﬁnancial sanctions against individuals
and entities involved in illicit natural resources trade in the Central African
Republic and the DR Congo.17 In order to enhance the effectiveness of its
sanctions, the Council has actively relied on several global and regional
mechanisms that have been created to address the problem of natural
resources ﬁnancing armed conﬂicts.18
Amongst these are informal mechanisms such as the 2002 certiﬁcation
scheme for rough diamonds developed by the Kimberley Process (KPCS) to
tackle the trade in ‘conﬂict diamonds’19 and the 2010 OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conﬂict-Affected
(b) Concluding with state authorities an agreement to exploit natural resources, in
violation of the legal and regulatory procedures of the State concerned;
(c) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources through corrupt practices;
(d) Concluding an agreement to exploit natural resources that is clearly one-sided;
(e) Exploiting natural resources without any agreement with the State concerned;
(f ) Exploiting natural resources without complying with norms relating to the protec-
tion of the environment and the security of the people and the staff; and
(g) Violating the norms and standards established by the relevant natural resource
certiﬁcation mechanism.’
17 For a more detailed discussion of these sanctions regimes, see D.A. Dam-de Jong, International
Law and Governance of Natural Resources in Conﬂict and Post-Conﬂict Situations (Cambridge
University Press 2015); and Security Council Report, ‘UN Sanctions: Natural Resources’,
Research Report (2015) No. 4, www.securitycouncilreport.org (last visited 1 February 2016).
18 See D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘UN natural resources sanctions regimes: Incorporating market-based
responses to address market-driven problems’, in L.J. van den Herik (ed.), Research Handbook
on UN Sanctions and International Law (Cheltenham Glos, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017).
19 For the purposes of the KPCS, conﬂict diamonds have been deﬁned as ‘rough diamonds used
by rebel movements or their allies to ﬁnance conﬂict aimed at undermining legitimate
governments, as described in relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions
insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in
the future, and as understood and recognized in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future’. See
KPCS Core Document, available at www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document
(visited 17 March 2016).
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and High-Risk Areas (OECD Guidance) which assists companies in assess-
ing the risks of their mineral purchases to contribute to the commission of
international crimes and gross human rights abuses.20 In addition, the
2009 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created to
increase transparency and accountability in the extractive sector by publish-
ing company payments to governments. These are just some of the overlap-
ping non-criminal initiatives that might help in plotting the new crime’s
signiﬁcance across a wider set of regulatory initiatives, but at the same time,
these initiatives might be relevant in construing the term ‘illicit’ within this
novel offence itself. The relationship between these overlapping criminal
offences, complementary regulatory initiatives and the new crime
announced within the Protocol is therefore a question that is complex,
intriguing and unexplored.
At the same time, this novel crime also raises a number of fundamental
concerns, most importantly relating to its scope and speciﬁcity. While the
provision itself enumerates a limitative list of seven acts that would fall under
the crime, the deﬁnition of these acts is broad and open to multiple interpret-
ations. At times, there is uncertainty about which overlapping ﬁeld the
reference to ‘illicit’ exploitation appeals to, but other times interpretative
difﬁculties stem from a failure to set out the scope of the seven sub-offences
in terms that will come close to satisfying the demands of a defensible criminal
prohibition. In particular, these difﬁculties pose an inherent danger of over-
reach and uncertainty that frequently risks compromising the foundational
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. In addition, the list omits particular acts
that would logically fall under the deﬁnition of illicit exploitation of natural
resources, most particularly the exploitation of natural resources in contraven-
tion of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. In what follows, we
20 The OECD Guidance was last revised in April 2016. Strictly speaking, the OECD Guidance is
not a global instrument, since it only applies to companies which are based in an OECD
member State. Nevertheless, the OECD Guidance has also been incorporated in the regional
system of the International Conference for the African Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), it has
been endorsed by the UN Security Council and it has resulted in the creation of similar
guidelines in non-OECD member States, most importantly the guidelines developed by the
Chinese Chamber of Commerce. See www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm (visited
30 May 2016); the Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (2010), para. 12; UN Security
Council Resolutions 1952 (2010), para. 8 and 2198, para. 22 on the DR Congo and Resolution
2153 (2014) on Côte d’Ivoire, para. 31; and China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals
and Chemicals Importers & Exporters, Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible
Mineral Supply Chains (2015), available at www.cccmc.org.cn/docs/2015-10/
20151029133501092584.pdf (visited 17 March 2016).
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attempt to plot these and other related concerns while elucidating the scope of
the novel offence – as incorporated in Article 28L Bis.
3. the scope of the provision
Illicit Exploitation is potentially a very broad term. A wide variety of laws –
both national and international – govern different aspects of the resource
extraction process. Given the absence of ofﬁcial travaux préparatoires for
The Protocol, our attempt to identify which norms the offence contemplates
is necessarily based on an interpretation of the provision itself within the
context of international law generally. In this light, one of the major strengths
of Article 28L Bis is that it includes a limitative list of acts that constitute ‘illicit
exploitation’ for the purposes of the provision. The deﬁnition is thus a
welcome attempt to resolve some of the contests about the meaning of the
term ‘illegal’ exploitation in other contexts,21 although as we suggest earlier, it
still leaves a series of very important questions unanswered. Before we address
these intricacies, we pause to consider the overarching chapeau elements that
must be satisﬁed for each of the underlying sub-offences. Structurally speak-
ing, the new crime is vaguely reminiscent of crimes against humanity: it
contains an overarching chapeau that operates as a kind of threshold triggering
the application of the list of seven sub-offences that are enumerated beneath
this threshold. The analysis that follows mimics this structure, commencing
21 Two of these attempts merit closer attention. Firstly, the UN Panel of Experts on the DR
Congo, which had been established by the Security Council to collect information on the
illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DR Congo and to analyze the links between
natural resources and the continuation of the conﬂict, opted for a very broad deﬁnition of
illegal exploitation in its 2001 report. Its deﬁnition of ‘illegality’ hinged on the following four
factors related to the rule of law: a violation of sovereignty, speciﬁed as all activities that are
conducted ‘without the consent of the legitimate government’; conducting activities in
violation of the existing regulatory framework of the country of operation; activities that are
contrary to widely accepted business practices; and activities carried out in violation of
international law, including soft law. The term ‘exploitation’ was similarly deﬁned broadly so as
to include ‘all activities that enable actors and stakeholders to engage in business in ﬁrst,
secondary and tertiary sectors in relation to the natural resources and other forms of wealth of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’. See Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 12 April 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/357, p. 5. The second attempt has been made by the
ICGLR for the purposes of its Protocol on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. Art. 1 of
the Protocol deﬁnes illegal exploitation as ‘any exploration, development, acquisition, and
disposition of natural resources that is contrary to law, custom, practice, or principle of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the provisions of this Protocol’. Illegal
exploitation as deﬁned by the Panel of Experts and the ICGLR Protocol therefore includes a
wide range of aspects of the extraction process, while illegal also refers to a broad range of
legal bases.
Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources 597
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.022
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 06 May 2019 at 07:37:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
with an analysis of the chapeau, then continuing to consider the various sub-
offences one by one.
By way of preliminary observation, it is important to note that the provision
does not formulate distinct objective or subjective requirements for the cha-
peau itself or for the various sub-offences.22 One would normally refer to
general provisions concerning the mental elements of crimes for the purposes
of The Protocol or detailed deﬁnitions of the criminal offences themselves,
but alas these are deﬁned nowhere in the instrument. While the Protocol
contains an explicit provision on corporate criminal liability, which deﬁnes
knowledge and intent in the corporate context,23 a similar provision for
individuals is lacking in the current draft of The Protocol.24 Similarly, there
is nothing in the Protocol that replicates the clarity and detail of the ICC
Elements of Crimes, which seek to provide greater legal clarity to crimes that
are broadly deﬁned in the abstract within the ICC Statute itself. To a large
extent, the absence of these details undermines The Protocol’s creative
attempt to criminalize Illicit Exploitation and makes what follows speculative
on our part, but we hope that our preliminary analysis provides guidance that
may be useful for scholarly debate, judicial interpretation or legislative reform.
A. The Chapeau Requirement of Seriousness
To recall, the chapeau for the new crime stipulates that ‘illicit exploitation of
natural resources’ means ‘any of the following acts if they are of a serious nature
affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union.’25 The chapeau require-
ment acts as a qualiﬁcation for all of the seven underlying crimes that make up
the umbrella crime of Illicit Exploitation. In other words, the chapeau is an
attempt at limiting these offences somehow, given the veritable sea of transac-
tions (minor and grave) it would capture without an initial threshold of this
sort. Troublingly, though, the meaning of the terms ‘serious nature’ and
‘affecting the stability’ remain entirely without further deﬁnition, requiring that
courts develop their own understandings in much the same ways as modern
22 See supra note 1, for the text of the provision.
23 See Art. 46C of The Protocol, which stipulates that ‘[c]orporate intention to commit an offense
may be established by proof that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which
constituted the offense’, where a ‘policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the
most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation.’ Corporate knowledge on the
other hand ‘may be established by proof that the actual or constructive knowledge of the
relevant information was possessed within the corporation [. . .] even though the relevant
information is divided between corporate personnel.’
24 Art. 46B on individual criminal responsibility does not set out clear mens rea requirements.
25 Emphasis added.
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understandings of crimes against humanity have emerged over the past
decades. In what follows, we make a ﬁrst attempt at plotting several ways of
interpreting the chapeau requirement in ways that balance the desire for this
offence to address the heart of the problem of Illicit Exploitation without
casting such a broad net that the offence is unacceptably over-inclusive.
We take the terms ‘affecting the stability of a state, region or the Union’ and
‘serious nature’ as implying separate tests, so deal with each in turn. With
respect to the former, it strikes us that a variety of different illicit resource
transactions might ‘affect the stability of a state, region or the Union’ in
different ways. Clearly, transactions that have an important impact on the
advent or maintenance of warfare affect stability in clear terms. The illicit
harvesting of timber in Liberia’s civil war as well as the exploitation of
Congolese coltan at different points in ‘Africa’s First World War’ had this
effect, and to employ an example from outside Africa, the illegal exploitation
of Kuwaiti oil by Iraq in 1991 was clearly a factor that affected the stability of
the state and region. In each of these scenarios, the transactions had negative
impacts on stability in that they produced or sustained war. We see no
particular reason, however, to view stability as coterminous with warfare.
The term ‘stability’ might possibility extend to other scenarios, where illicit
resource transactions produce political or health crises, major displacement,
severe environmental damage or otherwise have serious impacts on the safety
of the general population. The difﬁculty is that without deﬁning the term
‘stability,’ it is hard to discern whether any of these factors short of warfare will
satisfy the chapeau for the crime. We would therefore recommend to reﬂect
upon the scope of the term stability in light of the purpose of the provision.
A broad understanding of this term may enhance the possibilities for the Court
to play a meaningful role in addressing acts of natural resources exploitation
that have serious repercussions for human beings or the environment outside
situations of armed conﬂict or generalized violence.
Unfortunately, the requirement that the illicit transaction be of a ‘serious
nature’ is not markedly clearer either. The illicit trade in diamonds incontest-
ability affected the stability of Angola and the Great Lakes Region over several
decades up until the early 1990s, so individuals who were engaged in illicit
transactions of a ‘serious nature’ within the Angolan diamond trade might
conceivably be captured by the language in the chapeau.26 But which trans-
actions are of a serious nature? Here we see three options:
26 Although the parallel is not entirely direct, this interpretation of “a serious nature affecting the
stability of a state, region or the Union” operates in a manner similar to “a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population” in the chapeau of Crimes Against Humanity.
Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources 599
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.022
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 06 May 2019 at 07:37:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
First, one might deﬁne ‘seriousness’ is causal terms, eliminating actors who
were making overdetermined causes to the state of instability.27 If the defendant
was one of very many low-level purchasers of illicit conﬂict diamonds in
Angola, their contribution is less ‘serious’ than that of actors whose actions
were causally necessary for the state of affairs. On this interpretation of serious-
ness, this offence would be limited to politicians, military leaders, business-
people and companies that made an important difference to illicit resource
markets that destabilized the political system. On this reading, even those who
exploited a great deal of illicit resources would not be captured by the offence if
they were fungible for a set of other actors who would have done similarly if
they had not, emulating the focus on ‘those most responsible’ in other contexts.
Second, seriousness in this context could mean scale: an individual or
corporation involved in the extensive acquisition of illicit Angolan diamonds
might undertake acts ‘of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region
or the Union.’ This interpretation would exclude single, minor and isolated
acts of illicit exploitation, even if they did make some contribution to the
terrible state of instability in the region at the time, since these acts would in
themselves not be sufﬁciently serious. Of course, scale itself requires a thresh-
old determination which is sometimes difﬁcult to plot. Does one tally up the
entire quantum of diamonds exploited in Angola during the period, ascertain
the defendant’s relative contribution, and assert jurisdiction if that amount is
more than ﬁve, ten or twenty-ﬁve percent of the whole?
Third, one could interpret ‘serious nature’ in symbolic terms. If a bank was
directly involved in the illicit exploitation of Angolan diamonds, and the role of
banks in sustaining illicit resource transactions had never been exposed in Angola
or elsewhere, one might consider the responsibility of bankers and their corpor-
ations as serious for symbolic reasons. This interpretation is broadest because it
would hold regardless of the quantity of the resources illegally acquired or the
causal signiﬁcance of the bank’s contribution to the overall state of political
stability the trade in diamonds produced for Angola in our hypothetical. There-
fore, this option provides prosecutors then courts with considerable discretion.
We express no deﬁnitive preference for any one of these interpretative
options, although allowing the court an ability to pursue important symbolic
A defendant him or herself need not personally play an important role in the attack; his or her
individual crimes must only be adequately connected to it. See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić,
No. IT-94–1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment of 7May 1997, para. 649, referred to in C.K. Hall and
K. Ambos, ‘Article 7’, in O. Triffterer and K. Ambos, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary (Hart, Third edition 2016), at 165–6.
27 James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice
1189–218 (2012).
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cases might allow for a nuanced approach to addressing the illegal exploitation
of natural resources provided some of the shortcomings with this provision can
be addressed.
B. Acts that Constitute the International Crime
This section analyses the seven sub-offences included in Article 28L Bis,
which are enumerated beneath the chapeau requirement we have just
addressed. Structurally, what counts as ‘Illicit’ for the purposes of Article 28L
Bis results either from the conclusion of an agreement (sub-offences a-d) or
from the actual exploitation itself (sub-offences e-g). Interestingly however, the
provision does not deﬁne ‘natural resources’ or ‘exploitation’, two concepts
that are crucial to deﬁning the scope of the provision. For the purposes of this
analysis, we propose to follow the deﬁnitions included in the 2006 Protocol
Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, adopted by the Inter-
national Conference on the Great Lakes Region. Arguably, these deﬁnitions
are authoritative, since the text of Article 28L Bis has been taken directly from
Article 12 of this Protocol. The 2006 Protocol deﬁnes ‘natural resources’ as
‘substances provided by nature that are useful to human beings and have an
economic value [. . .]. The major types of natural resources include minerals,
ﬂora and fauna, ﬁshery products and water’.28 Even though a focus on the
economic value and utility of natural resources would be restrictive in other
contexts, this deﬁnition is appropriate for the purposes of Article 28L Bis,
which is exclusively concerned with acts of natural resources exploitation that
have an economic dimension. ‘Exploitation’ for its part is deﬁned as ‘any
exploration, development, acquisition, and disposition of natural resources’,
thereby encompassing the whole array of activities from mining to
marketing.29 The extent to which this deﬁnition also encompasses acquisition
of natural resources further up the supply chain is not entirely clear, yet it is
sufﬁciently open to accommodate forms of indirect appropriation. We will
now proceed to addressing each sub-offence in turn.
1. Concluding an Agreement to Exploit Resources, in Violation of the
Principle of Peoples’ Sovereignty over Their Natural Resources
The ﬁrst sub-offence of illicit natural resources exploitation as included in
Article 28L Bis refers to the conclusion of an agreement to exploit natural
28 ICGLR Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006,
Art. 1.
29 Ibid.
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resources ‘in violation of the principle of peoples’ sovereignty over their
natural resources’. There are two issues that are important to note from the
outset. First, the scope of this provision, which is limited to concluding
agreements, implies that the relevant indices for the crime can be found in
the terms of the agreement or the circumstances surrounding its conclusion.
Thus, the provision would not cover the exploitation of natural resources in
contravention of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources without an
agreement, which would be covered by other aspects of the offence.30 Second,
the interpretation of the term ‘peoples’ is of crucial importance for the scope
and addressees of the sub-offence. After all, the term ‘peoples’ can refer either
to the population of a State, to speciﬁc groups in a State or to the State itself.31
This section addresses both these issues.
The principle of peoples’ sovereignty over natural resources can be traced
back to the General Assembly resolutions adopted in the 1950s and 1960s
formulating a principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
(PSNR) as well as to Article 1(2) of the 1966 Human Rights Covenants.32
However, the principal point of reference for the interpretation of peoples’
sovereignty in Article 28L Bis of The Protocol would logically be Article 21 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is subject to the
jurisdiction of the African Court. This provision determines that ‘All peoples
shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be
30 These instances are covered by Art. 28L Bis(e), which criminalizes the exploitation of natural
resources without any agreement with the State concerned.
31 J. Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law’, in Alston, P. (ed.),
Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European Law (Oxford University Press 2001), at 7–67; and R.N.
Kiwanuka, ‘The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’,
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 82, No. 1 (1988), at 80–101.
32 See UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources, 14December 1962; 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), New York, Annex to UNGA Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966,
993 UNTS 3; 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), New York,
Annex 2 to UNGA Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. The principle
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has acquired a ﬁrm status in international law.
It has been recognized by the International Court of Justice as having customary international
law status. See e.g. International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J.
Reports 2005, para. 244. It has also been inserted in several treaties, especially in the ﬁeld of
international environmental law. For a detailed examination of the principle of permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, see N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources:
Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); D. Rosenberg,
Le Principe de Souveraineté des Etats sur Leurs Ressources Naturelles (Paris, France: Librairie
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1983); G. Elian, The Principle of Sovereignty over
Natural Resources (The Netherlands: Sĳthoff & Noordhoff, 1979).
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exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be
deprived of it’. Article 21 of the African Charter has proven to be very valuable
for the protection of minority rights,33 but has also been invoked by States in
their relationship with other States.34 Therefore, the right of peoples to freely
dispose of their natural resources accrues both to States themselves and to
groups within a State. The ICGLR Protocol on Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources deﬁnes this relationship more clearly. Article 3 determines that
‘Member States shall freely dispose of their natural resources. This right shall
be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case, the populations
of a State shall be deprived of it’.35 We here discuss some of the principal
scenarios that come within the reach of the sub-offence when it is construed
in this manner.
First, the sub-offence would potentially cover agreements concluded
between armed groups and (foreign) companies that violate the State’s right
to freely dispose of its natural resources. There are numerous examples in the
recent history of Africa concerning armed groups granting concessions to
companies to operate mines in territories under their control. For example,
the Panel of Experts on Angola revealed in a key report that before the
imposition of the diamond sanctions on Angola in 1998, the opposition group
UNITA had auctioned off mining permits to foreign companies for the
exploitation of mines within UNITA-controlled territory. In addition, the
Panel found that UNITA had granted various diamond buyers a licence to
operate within the areas under its control in exchange for a commission.36 If
one considers the principle of sovereignty over natural resources as an attri-
bute of State sovereignty, granting an exclusive authority to the government to
exploit natural resources on behalf of the population, these activities would
comfortably ﬁt within the current sub-offence. If, on the other hand, one
33 See references to relevant case law below. For a thorough examination of the notion of
‘peoples’ rights within the African Charter regime, see also R.N. Kiwanuka, ‘The Meaning of
“People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, Vol. 82, No. 1 American
Journal of International Law (1988) 80–101.
34 In the Congo-Uganda case, the ICJ based its decision on reparations on Art. 21(2) of the African
Charter, which determines that ‘[i]n case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the
right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation’.
International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005,
para. 245.
35 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources, 30 November 2006, Art. 3.
36 See the Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against
UNITA, UN Doc. S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, paras. 78 and 79.
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adopts a more human rights oriented approach, the ultimate question would
be whether the armed group concerned, in this case UNITA, would be
considered a representative of the people.
Second, this sub-offence might also cover resource agreements concluded
by foreign States or their nationals over resource endowments. In the Armed
Activities case before the International Court of Justice, for instance, the DRC
contended that Uganda had violated the DRC’s sovereignty over its natural
resources through illegal exploitation of these resources, including by allowing
Congolese rebel groups to trade with Ugandan businesses.37 Although the
Court concluded that permanent sovereignty over natural resources ‘is a
principle of customary international law’, it also found that there was nothing
suggesting that this principle is ‘applicable to the speciﬁc situation of looting,
pillage and exploitation of certain natural resources by members of the army of
a State militarily intervening in another State.’38 Nonetheless, as Judge Kor-
oma cogently argued in a separate opinion in that case, ‘these rights and
interests [permanent sovereignty over natural resources] remain in effect at all
times, including during armed conﬂict and occupation.’39 Thus, the factual
allegations the ICJ addressed in theDRC v. Uganda case might also satisfy this
limb of the offence of Illicit Exploitation.
Third, agreements by state ofﬁcials to the detriment of the State’s popula-
tion might also fall within the purview of the sub-offence. Africa has suffered
several kleptocratic rulers who divert natural resources revenues from the
national budget for their own personal gain through strong man politics and
patronage networks.40 Relevant examples include Sese Seko Mobutu, the
former president of Zaïre, currently the DR Congo, and Charles Taylor, the
former president of Liberia, who were both accused of using the country’s
natural resources for their own personal enrichment.41 These activities – at
least in as far as they concern the underlying agreements concluded with
companies allowing for the diversion of revenues – would likely be captured
37 See International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para.
226–9.
38 Ibid., para. 244.
39 Ibid., Declaration of Judge Koroma, para. 11.
40 W. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2011).
41 See e.g. for the DR Congo, Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the
Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003 (2010), p. 351; and for Liberia, Report of the
Panel of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), Paragraph 19,
Concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2001/1015, paras. 309–50.
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by the novel crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources as formulated in
Article 28L Bis(a) of The Protocol,42 since the ‘peoples’ sovereignty over
natural resources was violated by their political leaders. In this sense, the
offence is possibly a backdoor solution for the failure to criminalize kleptoc-
racy itself.43
Fourth, the sub-offence might also be relevant to concession agreements
that violate the rights of indigenous peoples over land. Even though there is
still considerable controversy about the precise scope of the rights of indigen-
ous peoples over their lands and the natural resources found therein,44 there is
growing recognition that these peoples’ special relationship with their lands
requires some form of protection, which would impact on States’ right to
regulate natural resources exploitation. The Ogoni case brought before the
African Commission provides a relevant example. The Commission con-
sidered in this case that the failure of the Nigerian government to regulate
and monitor the activities of private actors beneﬁtting from concessions on the
land inhabited by the Ogoni people constituted a violation of the State’s
obligation to act in the interest of the people when exercising its right to freely
dispose of its natural resources, notably because of the detrimental effects of
the corporate activities on the livelihood of the people of Ogoniland.45 There
is also a growing body of case law by other human rights bodies dealing with
42 Concluding agreements for personal enrichment would also be partly captured by Art. 28L Bis
(c), dealing with corrupt practices. However, this provision is limited to using corruption as a
means to conclude contracts, which, potentially, leaves out advantages that are derived from
the contract itself. This issue is examined under (c).
43 S. B. Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis
Situations, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 934470 (Social Science Research Network). However,
note that Art. 46A Bis of The Protocol determines that ‘No charges shall be commenced or
continued before the Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody
acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state ofﬁcials based on their functions,
during their tenure of ofﬁce’.
44 See A. Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination,
Culture and Land, (Cambridge University Press 2007); and N.J. Schrijver, ‘Unravelling State
Sovereignty? The Controversy on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Permanent Sovereignty
over their Natural Wealth and Resources’, in Boereﬁjn, I. & Goldschmidt, J. (ed.), Changing
Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Cees Flinterman
(Cambridge, UK: Intersentia 2008), at 85–98. See also the ﬁnal report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mrs. Erica Daes, on Indigenous peoples’
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 of 13 July
2004 and its addendum, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30/Add.1 of 12 July 2004.
45 Decision of the African Commission on Human & Peoples’ Rights Regarding
Communication 155/96, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, paras. 55–8. The relevant
provision is Art. 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
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the rights of indigenous peoples over land in relation to concessions con-
cluded by governments, indicating that there is an obligation for States to
consult indigenous peoples on natural resources projects.46
Notwithstanding these developments, the question can be raised whether
the actual conclusion of a concession agreement between the State and a
(foreign) company violates the sovereignty of indigenous peoples over their
natural resources. Most of the relevant cases deal with States’ obligations in
relation to secondary rights, for example to obtain prior and informed consent
by indigenous peoples or, as in the Ogoni case, to regulate the environmental
and social aspects of natural resources exploitation. In addition, whether
violations of the rights of indigenous peoples would reach the threshold
established in the chapeau is debatable. Arguably, instances in which agree-
ments affecting the rights of indigenous peoples would have an actual or
potential impact on the stability of the State itself would be exceptional. For
these reasons, it is uncertain if and to what extent the sub-offence would cover
agreements concluded by the State to the detriment of indigenous peoples.
2. Concluding with State Authorities an Agreement to Exploit
Natural Resources, in Violation of the Legal and Regulatory
Procedures of the State Concerned
The second sub-offence of ‘illicit exploitation of natural resources’ aims to
criminalize the conclusion of contracts with state ofﬁcials in violation of
procedures set out in relevant national legislation. Some may argue that this
provision is unduly onerous. Whether one should hold an investor criminally
responsible for concluding an agreement contrary to domestic law, when this
agreement is concluded with state authorities as the guardians of their own
laws and regulations is disputable. This concern is all the more valid if one
considers that the provision is formulated broadly. It refers generally to domes-
tic ‘legal and regulatory procedures’. Does this mean that any violation of
these procedures would be criminal for the purposes of this provision? Or
would the provision only apply to laws and regulations that aim to protect
important values of the host State? In addition, should the African Court be
allowed to scrutinize the policies of sovereign States, which may have good
reasons to exempt a project from its regulatory procedures? Notwithstanding
46 See e.g. the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Surinam,
Judgment of 28 November 2007; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Kichwa people
of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Judgment of 26 July 2012; Human Rights Committee, Apirana
Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993, 15 November 2000.
606 Daniëlla Dam de Jong and James G. Stewart
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108525343.022
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 06 May 2019 at 07:37:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
the fact that the chapeau can play an important role in limiting the instances
to which the sub-offence applies, there is a need to deﬁne the elements of the
current sub-offence more clearly. Current case law by international invest-
ment tribunals regarding the legality of investments may be a helpful refer-
ence in this regard,47 but mostly the issue is one that warrants far greater
thought. The principal question would be what type of acts the provision aims
to target: would it be conﬁned to situations where investors collude with State
authorities acting ultra vires or would it also encompass other situations? In the
following, two examples will be provided to demonstrate the types of situations
that are potentially covered by the sub-offence.
A Nigerian case provides a ﬁrst relevant example. This case involved a
contract concluded by Shell and Eni with the Nigerian government to exploit
a major oil ﬁeld off the coast of Nigeria. The Nigerian government allegedly
acted as a middle-man for the Nigerian company Malabu, said to be owned by
the former oil minister Dan Etete.48 After the conclusion of the deal, the
money was allegedly transferred to Malabu and diverted to Etete’s personal
bank account.49 In 2014, the Nigerian House of Representatives called on the
Nigerian government to cancel the deal, describing it as ‘contrary to the laws
of Nigeria’.50 If Shell and Eni knew that the Nigerian government acted only
as a middle-man,51 this incident could arguably come within the purview of
the current sub-offence, although we reiterate the complexities of discerning
whether particular transactions meet the chapeau threshold and again high-
light the absence of any indications about the requisite mental elements for
these crimes.
Liberia offers a slight variation of the same offence. A 2013 audit report
commissioned by the staff of the Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency
47 See R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Second edition, 2012), at 92–7 for examples of cases where arbitral tribunals
denied jurisdiction on these grounds.
48 See Global Witness, Shell and Eni’s Misadventures in Nigeria: Shell and Eni at risk of
losing enormous oil block acquired in corrupt deal, November 2015, available online at
www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/shell-and-enis-misadventures-nigeria/
(visited 12 May 2016).
49 See Global Witness, Shell and Eni’s Misadventures in Nigeria: Shell and Eni at risk of
losing enormous oil block acquired in corrupt deal, November 2015, available online at
www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/shell-and-enis-misadventures-nigeria/
(visited 12 May 2016).
50 Ibid., p. 3.
51 This is currently being investigated in Nigeria and Italy, with the cooperation of the Dutch
authorities. See E. Sylvers and S. Kent, ‘Shell Under Investigation in Italy over Nigerian Oil
Deal: Anglo-Dutch Oil Giant Drawn into Corruption Probe that has Dogged Italy’s Eni’, The
Wall Street Journal 30 March 2016.
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Initiative (LEITI) to investigate 68 contracts concluded by the Liberian
authorities between 2009 and 2011 determined that 90 per cent of these
contracts violated the provisions of relevant mining and forestry laws.52
Although it is not entirely clear whether the Liberian cases would in them-
selves meet the threshold set by the chapeau of Art. 28LBis, it is important to
consider these in light of Liberia’s recent history. It was only a decade ago that
major scandals in the Liberian mining sector were considered to constitute
such a threat to the Liberian peace process that international donors initiated
an intrusive yet fairly successful programme, the Governance and Economic
Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP), to improve public adminis-
tration, focusing inter alia on concession procedures.53 With the caveats we
mention throughout, these too might violate this limb of the new offence
enshrined within The Protocol.
3. Concluding an Agreement to Exploit Natural Resources
through Corrupt Practices
This sub-offence seeks to criminalize a widespread phenomenon, which
severely diminishes the chances that African peoples will beneﬁt from their
natural resource endowments. Corruption can take several forms in relation to
natural resources. In addition to the diversion of revenues obtained from
exploration and exploitation contracts, another commonly used method is
the undervaluation of public natural resources deposits. The 2013 Africa Pro-
gress Report concluded, for example, that assets in the mining industry in the
DR Congo were sold on average at one-sixth of their estimated value.54 Even
though the Panel focused on the undervaluation itself and did not investigate
allegations of corruption, it did signal that corruption would be one of the
factors explaining the undervaluation.55 Signiﬁcantly, this sub-offence would
52 Final Report for the Liberia Extractive Transparency Initiative (LEITI) Post Award Process
Audit, conducted by Moore Stephens LLP, May 2013, available online at www.leiti.org.lr/
uploads/2/1/5/6/21569928/leiti_post_award_process_audit_ﬁnal_report.pdf (visited on
24 May 2016).
53 See e.g. R. Dwan and L. Bailey, Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance
Programme (GEMAP), A joint review by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the World Bank’s Fragile States Group, May 2006.
54 Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All,
Africa Progress Report 2013, at 56. The Panel based its ﬁndings on ﬁve deals concluded
between 2010 and 2012.
55 Ibid. See also Global Witness, Digging in Corruption: Fraud, Abuse and Exploitation in
Katanga’s Copper and Cobalt Mines, July 2006, at 35–8 for earlier examples.
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criminalize corruption in these circumstances, again under the umbrella of
Illicit Exploitation.
For deﬁnitional purposes, the current sub-offence should be read in con-
junction with Article 28I of The Protocol, which criminalizes acts of corrup-
tion ‘if they are of a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region or the
Union’. The term ‘corruption’ in Article 28I is deﬁned so as to include inter
alia the offering or acceptance of ﬁnancial beneﬁts or other advantages, by or
to public ofﬁcials, persons directing or working for private entities or other
persons in a position to exert improper inﬂuence on the decision-making
process, whether for their own advantage or for the advantage of third persons.
The provision covers acts of bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment and
concealment. It thereby largely follows the principal categories of corruption
established in the 2004 UN Convention Against Corruption and complements
its provisions on domestic criminalization.56 Borrowing this provision from
elsewhere in The Protocol is therefore very appropriate in interpreting this
limb of Illicit Expropriation.
If this reading is accurate, however, this third limb of the deﬁnition of illicit
exploitation of natural resources is somewhat duplicative of acts criminalized
elsewhere in The Protocol. In other words, what would be the added value of
including a separate sub-offence under the heading ‘illicit exploitation of
natural resources’ allowing for the prosecution of corrupt practices as a means
to conclude an agreement to exploit natural resources if these corrupt prac-
tices can also be prosecuted as acts of corruption in their own right? From this
perspective, the inclusion of the current sub-offence in The Protocol predom-
inantly has symbolic value, in the sense that it emphasizes that all forms of
ﬁnancial or other incentives used to persuade a person in a position of power
to conclude a contract are criminal.
4. Concluding an Agreement to Exploit Natural Resources
That Is Clearly One-Sided
This sub-offence is worded very vaguely and can only be properly understood
with reference to the French authentic version of the text, which criminalizes
56 It should however be noted that in some respects The Protocol adopts a narrower deﬁnition of
corruption than the UN Convention. The Protocol, for example, restricts embezzlement to the
redirecting of State funds by public ofﬁcials, thereby using a narrower construction than Art. 17
of the UN Convention, which applies to both public and private funds entrusted to public
ofﬁcials. Also, The Protocol does not contain an equivalent to Art. 22 of the UN Convention,
regarding embezzlement by persons directing or working for private companies of funds or any
other thing of value entrusted to them.
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‘la conclusion par fraude ou par tromperie d’un contrat d’exploitation des
ressources naturelles’.57 According to the French text, the sub-offence would
apply to the conclusion of contracts by means of fraud or deception. We
recommend following this deﬁnition, since it is much more precise than the
reference to agreements that are ‘clearly one-sided’ in the English text. Upon
this reading of the text, the current sub-offence would apply to cases of
intention to deceive (state) authorities or business partners when negotiating
contracts. This can relate, for example, to misrepresentation by the investor of
its ﬁnancial capabilities or concealment of the company’s true ownership (shell
companies), provided of course that these forms of misrepresentation are of
such a serious nature as to actually or potentially affect national stability. State
ofﬁcials may also be liable for the offence if they undertake similar practices.
Other examples would relate to tax avoidance schemes that would deprive
the host state of substantial tax revenues.58 One way is the deliberate mispri-
cing of assets in cross-border intra-company transactions.59 This practice can
be avoided through the inclusion of express provisions in investment contracts
concluded between the host State and the investor stipulating that transfer
pricing should be based on the arm’s length principle, i.e. that it should reﬂect
actual market value.60 Arguably, the prosecution of these practices would send
a strong signal to companies that they should refrain from creating loopholes
in the system that produce grossly inequitable agreements in developing
countries. Nevertheless, whether this issue ﬁts squarely within the ambit of
this particular offence is a question that courts and scholars will have to
address in greater depth in the future.
5. Exploiting Natural Resources without Any Agreement
with the State Concerned
Read in conjunction with the chapeau, this limb is by far the most appropriate
aspect of Illicit Exploitation for addressing the trade in ‘conﬂict resources.’
57 See Protocole Portant Amendements au Protocole Portant Statut de la Cour Africaine de
Justice et des Droits de l’Homme, African Journal of International Criminal Justice (1) 1 (2014),
at 185.
58 See for examples Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, Natural Resource Contracts:
A Practical Guide, November 2013, available online at www.elaw.org/system/ﬁles/Natural_
Resource_Contracts_Guide.pdf (visited on 26 May 2016), at 29–33.
59 Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All,
Africa Progress Report 2013, at 65. See also the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010 (OECD Publishing 2010), DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tpg-2010-en.
60 See Ibid.
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The practice is often dependent on military and political elites who arrange
the exploitation and beneﬁt from its proceeds. In addition, businesspeople and
corporations often play an important role in perpetuating these practices,
either by procuring natural resources from armed groups or by exploiting
natural resources under the control of armed groups.61 Article 28L Bis(e)
could therefore provide a legal basis for prosecuting those involved in the
exploitation of conﬂict resources, whether this concerns senior members of
armed groups, corporations or their representatives.
However, there are important reasons to reconsider the formulation of this
limb, since it seems to portray the State as the only authority entitled to
alienate natural resources. We recommend interpreting the reference to
‘agreement with the State’ as requiring permission from an entity which has
the authority to dispose of the natural resources concerned. There are two
important reasons for opting for this interpretation. First, an exclusive focus on
the State as the only authority entitled to conclude agreements over the
exploitation of natural resources would have the effect of criminalizing com-
panies for doing business with private concessionaires or mine owners possess-
ing a valid legal title. Title in natural resources is regulated differently from
one jurisdiction to the next.62 Even in instances where States are the owners of
natural resources within their territory, they are perfectly capable of passing
this title on to private owners. Clearly, the drafters of this provision never
meant to criminalize cases where a businessperson, for instance, purchases
natural resources from a company that enjoyed title in those resources, even
though this is what the language of the provision suggests.
In addition, especially in the midst of a full-blown internal armed conﬂict, it
is not always clear which entity is entitled to formally represent the State and
therefore has the right to dispose of its natural resources. Even though there is
61 For examples of corporate involvement in the exploitation of conﬂict resources, see e.g. the
Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA,
UN Doc. S/2000/203, 10 March 2000, paras. 78, 79, 87–93; the Final Report of the Monitoring
Group on Angola, UN Doc. S/2000/1225, in particular, paras. 154–61; and the Report of the
Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), paragraph 19,
in relation to Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/1195, December 2000.
62 Of the roughly three models governing natural resources ownership across national
jurisdictions, only one (the concession system) vests ownership of natural resources in the state.
In this system, it is the State that has the exclusive authority to grant rights to search for, extract,
process, and sell these resources. Alternative systems are the claims system, which confers
ownership of minerals on anyone who discovers the deposit, subject only to certain formalities;
and the accession system, which vests ownership in natural resources to the owner of the land
where the resources are found. See J.G. Stewart,Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage
of Natural Resources (New York: Open Society Justice Initiative Publication 2011), at 40.
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a presumption in international law in favour of the incumbent government,63
there may be circumstances in which other entities have competing or even
better claims. Arguably, a right to exploit natural resources can accrue to
armed groups who are in effective control of parts of the State territory, as
long as the revenues obtained from the exploitation of natural resources are
used for the beneﬁt of the local population.64 By contrast, there may be
circumstances in which the incumbent government can no longer be deemed
to be entitled to dispose of the State’s natural resources. To illustrate, the UN
Security Council imposed an asset freeze on the Libyan authorities in 2011,
including on Libya’s national oil company as a ‘potential source of funding for
[Gaddaﬁ’s] regime’.65 In light of these shortcomings, we recommend
amending the provision by replacing ‘States’ with ‘owners’ or for courts to
interpret the provision in this fashion.
6. Exploiting Natural Resources without Complying with Norms
Relating to the Protection of the Environment and the
Security of the People and the Staff
This sixth sub-offence is a signiﬁcant departure from the preceding sub-
offences, in the sense that it is directly concerned with the protection of values
other than those related to ownership. Whereas earlier aspects of Illicit
Exploitation approximated to theft, this sub-offence instead focuses on the
effects of resource exploitation on the environment and human beings. A strict
reading of the provision would conﬁne the sub-offence to instances that satisfy
63 See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, (ﬁrst published in 1947; 2013 paperback
edition, Cambridge University Press), at 94 in relation to the recognition of governments more
generally; and D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Armed Opposition Groups and the Right to Exercise
Control over Public Natural Resources: A Legal Analysis of the Cases of Libya and Syria’,
Netherlands International Law Review 62(1), at 3–24 in relation to natural resources
exploitation.
64 See W. Reno, ‘CSR and Corporate Engagement with Parties to Armed Conﬂict’, in C. Walker-
Said and J.D. Kelly, Corporate Social Responsibility?: Human Rights in the New Global
Economy (Chicago, US: The University of Chicago Press Books 2015), at 259–77; J.G. Stewart,
Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources (Open Society Justice
Initiative Publication 2011), at 58–62; and D.A. Dam-de Jong, ‘Armed Opposition Groups and
the Right to Exercise Control over Public Natural Resources: A Legal Analysis of the Cases of
Libya and Syria’, Netherlands International Law Review 62(1), at 3–24.
65 See UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, para. 19 and Annex II. On
24 June 2011, the Sanctions Committee extended the assets freeze to a subsidiary of the Libyan
National Oil Corporation. See in this regard the following press release: ‘Security Council
Committee Concerning Libya Adds Names of Individuals and Entities to Its Travel Ban and
Assets Freeze List’, UN Doc. SC/10302, 28 June 2011.
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both elements: the release of toxic substances, for example, will harm the
environment and will also affect the security of the people and the staff. There
are, however, also instances where either the environment is harmed or the
security of the people and/or the staff are endangered. We presume that these
instances are also covered by the sub-offence, notwithstanding the use of the
word ‘and’ in The Protocol.
The ﬁrst issue that this limb may address is large-scale environmental
pollution caused by the mining industry, provided this would affect the
stability of the State. In this sense, it also aligns with current discussions
regarding the introduction of environmental crimes in international criminal
law.66 Environmental pollution would particularly affect the stability of the
State if it would harm vulnerable communities, who are dependent on the
environment for their livelihood, or when the pollution would cause serious
diseases amongst the population, as these effects would enhance grievances
amongst the population and thereby affect stability negatively. One of the
most well-known examples reaching this threshold is the environmental
pollution caused by oil spills in the Nigerian Niger delta, which have seriously
contaminated the fragile wetlands and their rich biodiversity, depriving the
local population of its basic means of subsistence and exposing them to major
health risks.67 Importantly, this pollution also had serious repercussions for the
security in the Niger delta.68
The provision may also address concerns arising from security measures to
protect the operations of extractive companies, especially when these oper-
ations are carried out in conﬂict-prone or conﬂict-torn regions. Mining com-
panies often use security forces to protect their interests, including State forces
and private security ﬁrms. Sometimes clashes occur between those security
66 S. Freeland, Addressing the Intentional Destruction of the Environment during Warfare under
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Intersentia 2015); and S. Jodoin and
M. Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development, International Criminal Justice, and Treaty
Implementation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2013).
67 See UNEP, Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland (2011), available online at
http://postconﬂict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf (visited 1 June 2016).
68 The environmental pollution caused by the oil spills has been the subject of several legal
procedures, including before the African Commission against the Nigerian government and
before Dutch courts against Shell. See the Decision of the African Commission on Human &
Peoples’ Rights Regarding Communication 155/96, The Social and Economic Rights Action
Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1;
District Court The Hague, Oguru-Efanga/Shell, Judgment of 30 January 2013, ECLI:NL:
RBSGR:2013:BY9850; District Court The Hague, Dooh/Shell, Judgment of 30 January 2013,
ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9854; and District Court, Akpan/Shell, Judgment of The Hague
30 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BY9854. The case is currently in appeal. In addition,
Shell settled a case out of court that was ﬁled before the English court.
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ﬁrms and the local population, especially in reaction to popular protests against
the company’s operations. By way of example, clashes allegedly occurred in
Tanzania in 2011, when local villagers tried to enter a gold mine operated by a
British company in protest to their operations. The security forces were accused
of having used excessive violence against the population, including killings,
severe beatings and rape. The subsequent lawsuit ﬁled by the villagers in the
UK court was settled out of court in early 2015.69 In addition to incidents
involving local communities, companies have also been accused of using
excessive force against their own staff, sometimes in cooperation with local or
State authorities. A well-known example is the incident at the Marikana
platinum mine in South Africa in August 2002, when 34 workers who were
striking to improve their working conditions were allegedly killed by the
police.70 This incident led to a series of strikes throughout the country,
potentially bringing the ‘Marikana massacre’ within the ambit of the chapeau.
These are just some examples of violence used by companies or State author-
ities against local communities and staff, which could be addressed by the
current provision, provided one adheres to a broader reading of the sub-offence.
Lastly, the sub-offence could cover serious violations of fundamental safety
and health norms, such as exposing employees to dangerous substances or
exploiting natural resources without taking any precautions to prevent serious
accidents, such as explosions. Here again, it is unclear what violations of these
norms would reach the threshold set by the chapeau. Would the explosion of
a single mine affect the stability of a State, if it is symptomatic of a broader
pattern of violation of safety standards? To draw on a famous example from
outside both the resource sector and Africa, in 1997, the accounting ﬁrm Ernst
& Young completed an audit of a shoe manufacturing plant in Vietnam for
Nike. The report indicated that ‘there is no adequate water reserved for
comfort use of workers’, dust and toxic fumes in parts of the plant ‘exceeded
the standard from 6 to 177 times’, and ‘there are 128 employees (77.57%)
getting respiratory disease and 7 employees (4.24%) getting heart disease.’71
With the caveats about the chapeau requirement and the need to prove
mental elements that are not deﬁned in The Protocol, a repetition of similar
69 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, African Barrick Gold lawsuit (re. Tanzania),
available online at http://business-humanrights.org/en/african-barrick-gold-lawsuit-re-tanzania
(visited on 2 June 2016).
70 See S. Adelman, ‘The Marikana Massacre, the Rule of Law and South Africa’s Violent
Democracy’, (2) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 7 (2015) 243–62.
71 Ernst & Young Environmental and Labor Practice Audit of the Tae Kwang Vina Industrial Ltd.
Co., Vietnam, 13 January 1997. Available online at www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=2488&
printsafe=1. Last visited 7 December 2016.
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practices in the resource sector in Africa might violate this limb of The
Protocol’s deﬁnition of Illicit Exploitation.
A ﬁnal issue that needs to be clariﬁed relates to the term ‘norms’. The
reference to ‘norms’ in the provision is open-ended and begs the question of
what types of norms would be covered. Would these include soft law norms,
such as ILO standards, ISO standards for environmental protection, the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies or the Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights? Since the provision addresses the responsi-
bility of private companies in addition to state actors, it may be assumed that
norms and standards developed by non-binding instruments and national law
would be the principal benchmarks against which to assess the legality of their
behaviour. This does not have to be problematic from the perspective of legal
certainty, as long as these instruments provide sufﬁciently detailed guidance to
companies against which to assess their behaviour. However, on a more
fundamental level, one may wonder if it is appropriate to elevate so-called
‘voluntary’ instruments to the level of binding norms by criminalizing the
breach of their provisions.
7. Violating the Norms and Standards Established by the Relevant
Natural Resource Certiﬁcation Mechanism
This limb of the Illicit Exploitation offence criminalizes the violation of
norms and standards set by natural resources certiﬁcation mechanisms. Cur-
rently, there are two important resource certiﬁcation mechanisms in place in
Africa. These are the Kimberley Process Scheme for the Certiﬁcation of
Rough Diamonds (KPCS) and the ICGLR Regional Certiﬁcation Mechan-
ism for tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold (3TG). We brieﬂy consider both of
these certiﬁcation schemes, highlighting the very signiﬁcant implications that
arise from the quick criminalization of regulatory regimes that were some-
times created for states, frequently intended as soft law, and seldom given the
sort of precision that might ground criminal liability.
The KPCS requires States to adopt a system of internal controls designed to
eliminate conﬂict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into
or exported from their territory.72 For this purpose, participants must designate
Importing and Exporting Authorities, ensure that rough diamonds are imported
and exported in tamper-proof containers, adopt appropriate legislation to imple-
ment and enforce the Certiﬁcation Scheme, and collect, maintain and
72 Kimberley Process Certiﬁcation Scheme, available online at www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/
kpcs-core-document (visited 10 May 2016), Sect. IV(a).
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exchange ofﬁcial production, import and export data with other participants.73
The KPCS constitutes soft law, formulating non-binding ‘minimum require-
ments’ for States to implement in their domestic systems. The sudden crimin-
alization of violations of this scheme raises a series of important questions: (a)
which aspects of the KPCS fall within the scope of the crime; (b) can non-state
actors also violate the ‘norms and standards’ of the KPCS for the purpose of
Article 28L Bis(g) of The Protocol even though the scheme addresses States
exclusively;74 and (c) have states fully understood that the ways in which
violations of the KPCS were just transformed into supranational crimes?
The certiﬁcation mechanism developed by the ICGLR is the second
important regulatory scheme. This mechanism introduces a system of controls
aimed at guaranteeing that minerals exported from the ICGLR are conﬂict-
free.75 The system encompasses certiﬁcation for mines to attest that they are
conﬂict-free and meet certain minimum social standards.76 In addition, it
introduces a chain of custody tracking system for minerals to prevent any sort
of support to armed groups throughout the supply chain to the point of export
and, lastly, it comprises the certiﬁcation of mineral exports. This process is
monitored by government ofﬁcials and third party audits, while regional
databases for the designated minerals seek to bring greater transparency in
the mineral ﬂows.77 Contrary to the KPCS, the ICGRL certiﬁcation mechan-
ism does contain direct obligations for private actors, such as processors,
73 Kimberley Process Certiﬁcation Scheme, Sects. IV(b)–(f ).
74 If so, this sub-offense could cover some of the major issues which have hampered the
implementation of the KPCS since its very establishment, notably the issuing of fraudulent
certiﬁcates by state authorities allowing blood diamonds to enter the legal market See
www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/enforcement (visited on 14 October 2016).
75 ‘Conﬂict-free’ is deﬁned as ‘free from support for non-state armed groups or public or private
security forces who: (a) “illegally control mine sites or otherwise control transportation routes,
points where minerals are traded and upstream actors in the supply chain”; (b) “illegally tax or
extort money or minerals at points of access to mine sites, along transportation routes or at
points where minerals are traded”; and/or (c) “illegally tax or extort intermediaries, export
companies or international traders’. See the ICGLR Regional Certiﬁcation Mechanism
(RCM) – Certiﬁcation Manual, available online at www.oecd.org/investment/mne/49111368
.pdf (visited 10 May 2016), at 4.
76 These minimum standards seek to eliminate ‘“any forms of torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment”; (ii) “any forms of forced or compulsory labour, which means work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which said
person has not offered himself voluntarily”; (iii) “the worst forms of child labour”; (iv) “other
gross human rights violations and abuses such as widespread sexual violence”; and, (v) “war
crimes or other serious violations of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity
or genocide”.’ See the ICGLR Regional Certiﬁcation Mechanism (RCM) – Certiﬁcation
Manual, at 4.
77 See Ibid.
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comptoirs, smelters and other exporting entities, the latter deﬁned as a ‘com-
pany, cooperative, individual or other entity that exports Designated Minerals
from a Member State’.78 Relevant obligations include an obligation to refrain
from purchasing minerals from uncertiﬁed mines and an obligation to ensure
that other actors upstream in the supply chain, i.e. those actors from which the
minerals are purchased, act in compliance with the relevant standards set by
the mechanism.79 Since these obligations are numerous, sometimes proced-
ural and not explicitly speciﬁed, we believe that this sub-offence is overly
broad and requires clariﬁcation.
More generally, it is questionable whether the violation of ‘norms and
standards’ that are part of soft law should be recognized as an international
crime at all. Even as far as these norms and standards have been included in
domestic legislation, the transformation of these non-criminal ‘norms and
standards’ into a supranational criminal offence may strike some as controver-
sial if not harsh. The problem with the norms and standards included in
certiﬁcation mechanisms is that, apart from having been drafted as best
practices in the industry rather than criminal offences, they are continually
subject to change. Both shortcomings are problematic from the perspective of
providing the legal certainty required for a serious criminal offence. Thus,
reformulating this sub-offence as a separate crime, moving away from ‘norms
and standards’, and focusing on the issue of due diligence obligations for
companies may better delimit this offence. The OECD Due Diligence
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conﬂict-Affected
and High-Risk Areas can be a useful tool in this respect, since it provides a
clear ﬁve-step framework for companies to exercise due diligence. Even here,
though, it would be highly advisable to translate these broad policies into
terms typical for criminal offences, including by stipulating the crime’s object-
ive and subjective elements explicitly.
4. conclusion
The crime of illicit exploitation of natural resources, as included in The
Protocol, is highly innovative. It provides new opportunities to address grave
78 ICGLR Regional Certiﬁcation Mechanism (RCM) – Certiﬁcation Manual, at 6.
79 Ibid., at 30. The latter obligation amounts to a due diligence obligation as set out under the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conﬂict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas. See OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conﬂict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Paris, France: OECD
Publishing, Third Edition, 2016), available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252479-
en (visited on 10 May 2016).
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injustices related to the exploitation of natural resources as well as to bolster the
abilities of African States to use their natural resource wealth for the beneﬁt of
their respective peoples. At the same time, the provision as currently formu-
lated is unsatisfactory in several dimensions. In some regards, the crime over-
criminalizes a whole raft of regulatory regimes no one previously thought gave
rise to criminal responsibility. In other instances, a strict reading of the Protocol
would result in the criminalization of perfectly legal acts. Elsewhere, there is
the problem of overlap, both within the provision and in relation to other
provisions included in The Protocol. Overall, the absence of any mention of
objective or subjective elements capable of proving the offence transgress basic
principles in the criminal law. The shortcomings that we have identiﬁed in this
chapter point to a need to further reﬁne both the scope of the provision as well
as its intention. We recommend the drafting of elements of crimes as a way to
resolve some of the difﬁculties we point to. The reality of resource predation,
especially in Africa, is a subject of major concern that has justiﬁably attracted
considerable attention. The criminal law should certainly play a role in
responding to this morose reality; indeed, much of our work stems from the
view that accountability in this realm is long overdue, and that in some
instances, it is difﬁcult to imagine long term stability in regions without a
robust concept of title in natural resources and powerful regulatory regimes to
enforce violations of this title. Nevertheless, the foregoing suggests that the
criminal law should serve a very principled role in addressing the problem that
conforms with a very orthodox understanding of fair punishment.
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